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I. OVERVIEW 
A.  Introduction 
Assume two large corporations form a partnership 
(“Partnership”) that acquires, for cash, all of the stock of another 
corporation (“Target”) that is promptly liquidated after its 
acquisition to effectuate Partnership’s ultimate goal of acquiring 
Target’s appreciated assets.  Might Partnership, citing the Kimbell-
Diamond Doctrine (hereinafter, the “KD Doctrine”), claim that 
Target is exempt from paying income tax for the gain that is 
 
 †  Don W. Bakke is a manager in the Mergers & Acquisitions Group of Ernst 
& Young’s National Tax Department in Washington, D.C.  He received his J.D. 
from William Mitchell College of Law in 1995, and his LL.M. (Taxation) from 
Georgetown University Law Center in 1999.  The author gratefully acknowledges 
the thoughtful assistance and comments from James C. Warner, Kirsten Simpson 
and Lisa Joire.  The views expressed herein are the author’s alone, and are not 
necessarily those of Ernst & Young, LLP. 
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otherwise recognized upon a liquidating corporation’s distribution 
of appreciated property?1 
Partnership would be invoking a doctrine that, since the 
middle of the twentieth century, was an analytical touchstone of 
income tax analysis.  The doctrine generally held that an acquiring 
party (often a corporation) that purchased the stock of Target 
could treat its acquisition as though it had directly purchased 
Target’s assets, if that was the acquirer’s intent, it otherwise would 
have purchased the assets directly, and if Target was promptly 
liquidated following the acquisition.  However, because of statutory 
changes with respect to corporate purchasers, the doctrine was fast 
fading from prominence by 1980, when an appellate court held 
“definitively and absolutely that the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine is 
extinct.”2  Any remaining doubt about the viability of the doctrine 
was ostensibly eliminated in 1982, when Congress, with the 
enactment of section 338,3 explicitly stated that such provision was 
intended to replace any non-statutory treatment under the KD 
Doctrine.4 
As discussed within this Article, though, it is unclear whether 
the doctrine was ever completely eliminated.  And especially with 
respect to non-corporate acquirers such as Partnership, it is 
questionable whether the doctrine’s scope has been limited at all, 
leaving these taxpayers with strong arguments for claiming 
exemption from a gain recognition provision of the Code. 
B.  The Kimbell-Diamond Doctrine 
The KD Doctrine, which has also been referred to as the “asset 
acquisition doctrine,” is illustrative of yet another impressive 
“doctrine” that informs corporate income tax analysis: the step 
transaction doctrine.5  The step transaction doctrine is a recurring 
 
 1. All references to “Code” are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended (“I.R.C.”). 
 2. Chrome Plate, Inc. v. Dist. Dir. Of Internal Revenue (In Re Chrome 
Plate), 614 F.2d 990, 1000 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 3. All references to “section,” unless otherwise noted, are to the applicable 
section of the Code. 
 4. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 97-760, at 536 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
781, 1310. 
 5. See Sec. Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1234, 1244 (5th Cir. 
1983) (“The step-transaction doctrine is a corollary of the general tax principle 
that the incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction rather 
than its form.”). 
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and fundamental theme permeating the tax law and has been the 
subject of numerous articles and commentary, which this Article 
will not attempt to aggrandize.6  Suffice to say that, when the step 
transaction doctrine applies, a series of formally separate steps will 
be consolidated and treated as a single transaction if the steps are, 
in substance, integrated, interdependent, and focused toward a 
particular result.  This “doctrine,” in turn may be viewed as derived 
from the principle that the substance of a transaction should 
triumph over its form7 and that tax consequences should be based 
on the whole of what happened rather than on artificially separated 
parts; at least the government (if not the taxpayer) should have the 
option of being able to assert substance-over-form analysis when 
necessary. 
The KD Doctrine takes its name from the holding of Kimbell-
Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner,8 although, as discussed below, 
the doctrine9 pre-dated that case.  As used throughout this Article, 
references to the KD Doctrine will adopt the following definition: 
[W]hen stock in a corporation is purchased for the 
purpose and with the intent of acquiring its underlying 
assets and that purpose continues until the assets are 
taken over, no independent significance taxwise attaches 
to the several steps of a multiple step transaction.  The 
final step [the liquidation] is, therefore, viewed not as 
independent of the stock purchase but simply as one of 
the steps in a unitary transaction, the purchase of 
assets . . . .  The essence of the doctrine . . . in short, is that 
tax significance attaches not to the separate steps after the 
first one but to the transaction as a whole, each step in 
 
 6. See, e.g., Lewis R. Steinberg, Form, Substance and Directionality in Subchapter 
C, 52 TAX LAW. 457 (1999) (discussing applications of the step transaction 
doctrine); Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 859 (1982) (discussing the place of doctrine in deciding tax disputes). 
 7. Or, substance triumphs over empty forms, as articulated by Judge Frank 
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.  See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
Comm’r, 972 F.2d 858, 862 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 8. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff’d per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951). 
 9. It has also been referred to as a “rule” or “principle.”  Because “doctrine” 
seems to be the prevailing nomenclature during recent decades, this Article will 
use such term, without delving into the subject of the difference between a 
doctrine, rule or principle.  See, e.g., In re Chrome Plate, 614 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 
1980) (using the term “doctrine”); Griswold v. Comm’r, 400 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 
1968) (using the term “rule”); United States v. Mattison, 273 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 
1959) (using the term “rule”); Estate of Suter v. Comm’r, 29 T.C. 244 (1957) 
(using the term “principle”); Rev. Rul. 90-95, 1990-2 C.B. 67 (using the term 
“doctrine”). 
3
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which is viewed as an integral part of a single transaction, 
the purchase of assets.10 
The KD Doctrine is focused solely upon the transaction from 
the purchaser’s perspective, does not offer to account for the 
seller’s treatment of the transaction,11 and represents an instance 
where the federal income tax consequences accorded an overall 
transaction do not strictly follow the transaction’s “form.”  This may 
well reflect a judicial reluctance to place too heavy a premium 
upon strictly following form.12  However, this is an area of tension, 
as much of federal income tax practice is form-driven, and 
corporate income tax practice is no exception.13 
This tension between form and substance is illustrated by the 
following example.  Building upon the example introduced 
previously, assume that Partnership paid $1,000,000 for the stock of 
Target.14  The “form” of the transaction is comprised of two steps: a 
purchase of stock and a liquidation of the purchased corporation.  
The tax consequences attending the form are that Partnership has 
a basis of $1,000,000 in the stock of Target, as determined under 
section 1012.15  Assume as well that Target’s aggregate asset basis is 
$500,000 (Target’s “inside asset basis”) with a fair market value of 
$1,000,000 (assuming no consideration of the inherent tax 
liability).16  Thus, when Partnership, as Target’s sole shareholder, 
causes Target to dissolve under applicable state law, section 336 
would require that corporate-level gain be recognized upon the 
distribution of property in complete liquidation.17  Assuming the 
assets are properly valued at $1,000,000, Target thus has $500,000 
of recognized gain, and, at a thirty-five percent effective tax rate, a 
 
 10. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 264 F.2d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1959). 
 11. See infra note 224 and related text. 
 12. But see Comm’r v. Sansome, 60 F.2d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 1932) (criticizing 
judicial recourse, in certain taxation issues, to such “vague alternatives as ‘form’ 
and ‘substance,’ anodynes for the pains of reasoning”). 
 13. See Steinberg, supra note 6, at 457. 
 14. For purposes of simplicity, also assume that Target has no liabilities. 
 15. I.R.C. § 1012 (1986). 
 16. As the example illustrates, it is a mistake to assume that “inside” asset 
value equals “outside” stock value where the inside assets are appreciated and one 
cannot directly hold the assets without the incidence of taxation.  See BORIS I. 
BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 10.41[4] (7th ed. 2000) [hereinafter BITTKER & EUSTICE]. 
 17. I.R.C. § 336(a) (2001).  (“Except as otherwise provided in this section or 
section 337, gain or loss shall be recognized to a liquidating corporation on the 
distribution of property in complete liquidation as if such property were sold to 
the distributee at its fair market value.”). 
4
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federal income tax liability of $175,000, which Partnership has 
effectively inherited. 
But Partnership always intended to acquire Target’s assets and 
promptly liquidated Target to effect that objective, since it could 
not directly purchase the assets from Target.  Indeed, had 
Partnership instead negotiated a direct asset purchase, it would 
have a $1,000,000 basis in the acquired assets and would not have 
inherited a $175,000 tax liability.  Given Partnership’s ultimate aim, 
the application of the step transaction doctrine and the KD 
Doctrine would collapse the intervening step by which, for a 
moment, Target is a wholly-owned subsidiary corporation, and 
instead view the transaction as though Partnership paid $1,000,000 
to Target’s seller in exchange for Target assets.  This shortens a 
two-step acquisition into a one-step acquisition, at least from 
Partnership’s perspective.  As such, the liquidation provisions of 
the Code would play no role in determining the federal income tax 
consequences to Partnership.  Instead, Partnership would take a 
basis in the assets of $1,000,000, as determined under section 1012. 
The discussion in Part II traces the development of the KD 
Doctrine in an era where corporate liquidations generally had less 
federal income tax consequences than they do now.18  Part III 
considers what relevance the KD Doctrine has now, where 
corporate liquidations may have considerably greater tax 
consequences.19  As the following discussion illustrates, the KD 
Doctrine has developed along two major tracks: the predominant 
one involving corporate purchasers and referred to hereinafter as 
the “Corporate KD Doctrine,” and the less predominant 
manifestation of the KD Doctrine involving non-corporate 
purchasers, referred to hereinafter as the “Non-corporate KD 
Doctrine.”  Since much (if not all) of the Corporate KD Doctrine 
has been replaced by section 338 and the regulations thereunder, 
most of the focus of this Article is upon the Non-corporate KD 
Doctrine. 
 
 18. See infra, Part II. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
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II.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE 
A.  The Corporate Kimbell-Diamond Doctrine 
1.  Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. 
Curiously, the case of Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. 
Commissioner was not the first to establish what became known as 
the KD Doctrine.20  However, its facts are sufficiently illustrative 
and, thus, are recited below. 
A mill property of the Kimbell-Diamond Milling Company was 
destroyed by fire in August of 1942.21  Upon receipt of insurance 
proceeds, the company negotiated the purchase of another nearby 
milling property operating in corporate form, the Whaley Mill & 
Elevator Company (“Whaley”).22  The board of directors of Kimbell-
Diamond issued a resolution stating that, as soon as practicable 
after the purchase of the stock of Whaley, “all necessary steps be 
taken to completely liquidate the said corporation by transferring 
its entire assets, particularly its mill and milling equipment, to 
Kimbell-Diamond Milling Company in cancellation and 
redemption of the entire issued and outstanding capital stock of 
Whaley Mill & Elevator Company . . . .”23  Consistent with this 
declaration, the stock of Whaley was acquired on December 26, 
1942 for $210,000.24  Three days later, a plan of liquidation was 
entered into by Whaley and Kimbell-Diamond, which provided 
that, among other things, the stock was being acquired primarily 
for the purpose of enabling the Kimbell-Diamond Milling 
Company to obtain direct possession and ownership of the flour 
mill and milling plant assets owned by Whaley, and that the parties 
agreed that said assets would be conveyed to Kimbell-Diamond by 
Whaley in complete liquidation of Whaley, thus canceling the 
shares of Whaley held by Kimbell-Diamond.25  The liquidation was 
formally completed on December 31, 1942, less than a week after 
 
 20. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text. 
 21. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 74, 75 (1950). 
 22. Id. at 75-76. 
 23. Id. at 76. 
 24. Id.  The $210,000 was comprised of $118,200.16 in insurance proceeds to 
cover the destroyed assets as well as additional funds of $91,799.84.  Id. 
 25. Id. at 76-77. 
6
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the stock acquisition.26 
Consistent with the form of the transaction, Kimbell-Diamond, 
the purchasing corporation, treated the transaction as comprised 
of two independent steps: a stock purchase and a liquidation of a 
wholly-owned subsidiary.  The tax law provided then (much as it 
does now under section 332) that a corporate shareholder would 
recognize no gain or loss upon the receipt of property in complete 
liquidation of another corporation27 and would take a carryover 
basis in property received from a liquidating corporation.28  Since 
the aggregate adjusted basis of the depreciable Whaley assets (in 
the hands of Whaley) was approximately $139,522, Kimbell-
Diamond used this amount as its basis in the assets upon the 
liquidation of Whaley. 
Although initially unchallenged, the Service later amended its 
position with respect to depreciable asset basis.29  The deficiency 
notice issued by the Service to Kimbell-Diamond asserted that the 
milling company took too high a basis in the Whaley assets (and 
correspondingly larger-than-warranted depreciation deductions, 
among other items,) and thus owed additional income tax, 
declared value excess profits tax, and excess profits tax for the 
taxable years ending 1945 and 1946.30  The government asserted a 
basis in the depreciable Whaley assets of approximately $110,722.  
It arrived at this amount by using Kimbell-Diamond’s adjusted basis 
in the destroyed assets, $18,921.90, and adding to that amount the 
difference between the total amount expended in acquiring 
 
 26. Id. at 77. 
 27. I.R.C. § 112(b)(6) (1939).  Cf. I.R.C. § 332(a) (CCH 2001). 
 28. I.R.C. § 113(a)(15) (1939).  This provision, as amended, shares many 
similarities with current section 334(b), which generally provides for a carryover 
basis upon property received in complete liquidation of a subsidiary (generally, a 
corporation in which the parent corporation owns at least eighty percent of the 
stock of the subsidiary).  See I.R.C. § 334(b) (2001). 
 29. The government initially challenged Kimbell-Diamond’s treatment of the 
acquired assets as qualifying as tax-free under the involuntary conversion provision 
in existence at that time, although it lost on this score.  In this first round of 
litigation, the government also sought to challenge the basis given the assets by 
Kimbell-Diamond, but the Tax Court declined to address the issue then because of 
an undeveloped evidence record.  See Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Comm’r, 10 
T.C. 7 (1948). 
 30. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff’d by, 187 
F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951).  The declared value excess profits tax and the excess 
profits tax were wartime revenue-raising mechanisms which have since been 
repealed. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, c. 736, § 1, 68A Stat. 5 (superseding Internal 
Revenue Service Code of 1939 by Internal Revenue Service Code of 1954). 
7
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Whaley ($210,000) less the amount received from the insurance 
company ($118,200.16), or $91,799.84 ($18,921.90 + $91,799.84 = 
$110,721.74).  The government asserted that Kimbell-Diamond 
really acquired assets, and not stock, from Whaley. 
Kimbell-Diamond asserted that the transaction’s form should 
be respected and that it had received the Whaley assets in 
liquidation of another corporation and thus was entitled to the 
higher carryover basis in the assets.  The Tax Court cited the 
familiar refrain that “the incidence of taxation depends upon the 
substance of a transaction.”31  The court stated that this issue 
should be governed by the principles of Commissioner v. Ashland Oil 
& Refining Co.32  In Ashland Oil & Refining Co., the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed a Board of Tax Appeals decision holding 
that a corporate purchaser was entitled to a stepped-up basis in the 
assets of a liquidated corporation that it had purchased.33  Although 
the purchasers in Ashland had held on to their stock for nearly a 
year, the Ashland court stated “transitory ownership of stock is not 
necessarily of legal significance.”34  Thus, the Kimbell-Diamond court 
held that “the purchase of Whaley’s stock and its subsequent 
liquidation must be considered as one transaction, namely, the 
purchase of Whaley’s assets which was petitioner’s sole intention.”35  
Here, what later became known as the KD Doctrine was applied to 
the eponymous milling company to reduce its basis in acquired 
assets, thus representing a victory for the government, which was 
upheld on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.36 
2.  Other Illustrative Rulings 
As noted, the holding in Kimbell-Diamond was not without 
precedent.  For example, in Kimbell-Diamond the Tax Court cited 
Ashland Oil & Refining Co., a case that was decided twelve years 
 
 31. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co., 14 T.C. at 80 (citing Comm’r v. Court 
Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945)). 
 32. Id. (citing Comm’r v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1938), 
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939)). 
 33. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d at 593. 
 34. Id. at 591. 
 35. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co., 14 T.C. at 80. 
 36. 187 F.2d 718, 718 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).  
Perhaps the reason “Kimbell-Diamond rule” became the phrase describing the 
treatment accorded a stock purchase and liquidation was because it represented a 
government victory and the government’s subsequent use of the phrase.  See M. L. 
Cross, Annotation, Income tax: Corporate Assets As Received In Liquidation Or By 
Purchase Where Stock Is Purchased To Acquire Assets, 83 A.L.R.2d 718, 721 n.3 (1962). 
8
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earlier.37  In Ashland, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was called 
upon to review a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, which had 
concluded that a purchasing corporation was entitled to a stepped-
up basis in the assets of an acquired corporation that it had 
liquidated.38  The government argued on appeal that the 
liquidation was to be accorded independent significance, in that 
the purchasing corporation owned the stock for nearly a year 
(while the stock was formally held by an escrow agent) and had 
included the target corporation’s income in its own consolidated 
return in 1925.39  The Sixth Circuit framed the issue: 
[W]hether if the entire transaction, whatever its form, was 
essentially in intent, purpose and result, a purchase by 
Swiss [the purchasing corporation] of property, its several 
steps may be treated separately and each be given an 
effect for tax purposes as though each constituted a 
distinct transaction.  It is true that Swiss acquired all of the 
stock of Union [the target corporation].  But this is not 
decisive, for a transitory ownership of stock is not 
necessarily of legal significance.  It has been said too often 
to warrant citation that taxation is an intensely practical 
matter, and that the substance of the thing done and not 
the form it took must govern.40 
 “It seems clear,” the court concluded, that the transaction, 
although formally structured as a stock purchase and liquidation, 
was in substance a purchase of the assets belonging to the target 
corporation, since they could not otherwise be acquired.41 
Many other cases, both prior to and following the celebrated 
Kimbell-Diamond case, adopted the KD Doctrine,42 and the Service 
eventually acquiesced where the Service had been arguing against 
its application.43 
 
 37. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588. 
 38. Id. at 590. 
 39. Id. at 590-91. 
 40. Id. at 591 (citation omitted). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. M.O.J. Corp., 274 F.2d 713, 717 (5th Cir. 1960); 
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 264 F.2d 161, 162-63 (5th Cir. 1959); Prairie 
Oil & Gas Co. v. Motter, 66 F.2d 309, 311 (10th Cir. 1933); N. Am. Serv. Co. v. 
Comm’r, 33 T.C. 677, 692 (1960); Mills v. Comm’r, 30 T.C. 150, 154-55 (1958); 
Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Comm’r, 25 T.C. 408, 414-15 (1955); Koppers Coal 
Co. v. Comm’r, 6 T.C. 1209, 1218 (1946); Spang, Chalfant & Co., Inc. v. Comm’r, 
31 B.T.A. 721, 723 (1934); Warner Co. v. Comm’r, 26 B.T.A. 1225, 1228 (1932). 
 43. See, e.g., Suter v. Comm’r, 29 T.C. 244 (1957), acq. 1958-2 C.B. 8; and 
Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 25 T.C. at 414. 
9
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3.  Section 334(b)(2) of the 1954 Code 
a.  Enactment of Section 334(b)(2) 
Application of the KD Doctrine was based upon an analysis of 
the intent of the purchaser: i.e., whether the purchaser intended to 
acquire a target corporation’s assets all along.44  Such a standard, of 
course, involves significant subjectivity.  In an attempt to bring 
more objectivity and certainty to the tax treatment of stock 
purchases followed by liquidations,45 the House of Representatives, 
in 1954, proposed a new provision in the tax code by which “the 
principle of Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. . . . is effectuated.”46  As 
explained by the House report, it provided that “a shareholder will 
in general be permitted to receive the purchase price for his stock 
as his basis for the assets distributed to him in liquidation 
irrespective of the assets’ cost to the corporation.”47  The Senate, 
while agreeing that such language would effectuate the principle of 
Kimbell-Diamond, cut back on the statutory language proposed in 
the House, noting that since the application of the KD Doctrine “is 
primarily in the area of liquidations by a parent corporation of its 
subsidiary, the rule has been limited . . . to liquidations of this 
type.”48  Thus, 1954 Code section 334(b)(2) as enacted generally 
provided an exception to carryover basis treatment for property 
received by a parent acquiring corporation from a subsidiary in 
“complete liquidation.”49  The exception provided that, under 
certain conditions, a corporation liquidating a recently purchased 
subsidiary may use the cost of the purchased stock (adjusted by 
regulations) as the basis of the acquired assets, if at least eighty 
percent of the target corporation stock was acquired by purchase 
 
 44. See Kimbell-Diamond Milling. Co. v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 74, 80 (1950). 
 45. See Michael W. Dolan, Kimbell-Diamond, Chrome Plate, and Taxpayer Intent in 
the Liquidation of Subsidiaries: Should Congress Reexamine Section 334(b)(2)?, 8 J. CORP. 
TAX’N 281, 286-87 (1982) (citing American Law Institute’s draft “Federal Income 
Tax Statute” that noted the uncertainty in the application of the rule of Kimbell-
Diamond, and suggested that all liquidations be eligible for a basis marked by 
either the cost of the assets or the cost of the stock). 
 46. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4063. 
 47. Id. 
 48. S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 48 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 
4679. 
 49. I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1954) (amended 1982 & 1988) (original at Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 104 (1954)). 
10
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within a twelve-month period.50 
b.  Treatment of the Liquidation: Pittsburgh Realty 
The remedy provided by 1954 Code section 334(b)(2) did not 
ignore the liquidation event, as was often the case in the 
application of the KD Doctrine, but simply provided a different 
mechanism for determining the basis in assets acquired pursuant to 
such liquidation.  This point was illustrated well in 1976 when the 
Tax Court decided a case that involved many “typical” Kimbell-
Diamond facts.  In Pittsburgh Realty Investment Trust v. Commissioner,51 
a realty trust that qualified as a “real estate investment trust” 
(“REIT”) under section 856,52 sought to acquire certain real estate 
assets of a target corporation.53  Although the initial negotiations 
conducted by representatives of the trust with the sellers were with 
a view toward the direct purchase of the assets, the seller later 
insisted, upon advice of counsel, that the transaction take the form 
of a stock sale; they believed this structure would avoid the 
imposition of state real estate transfer taxes.54  On the purchasing 
side, however, representatives of the trust were concerned about 
the effect such a sale structure would have upon the trust’s 
continued qualification as a REIT.55  The acquiring trust thus 
applied for a private ruling from the Service that the trust’s 
qualification as a REIT would not be adversely affected by the 
acquisition of the target corporation, which would “be immediately 
followed by the liquidation of . . . [the target] pursuant to Section 
332 . . . .”56  An additional ruling requested was that, pursuant to 
 
 50. See, e.g., Broadview Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 561 F.2d 698, 714 
(7th Cir. 1977) (explaining stock was not acquired by purchase since it was 
acquired from a related party; purchaser ineligible for 1954 Code section 
334(b)(2) treatment). 
 51. 67 T.C. 260 (1976). 
 52. A REIT is defined to mean a “corporation, trust or association” that, 
among other things, would otherwise be taxable as a domestic corporation.  See 
I.R.C. § 856(a), (a)(3) (West Supp. 2001). 
 53. Pittsburgh Realty Inv. Trust, 67 T.C. at 263. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 266.  Under the rules in place at that time, at the end of each 
quarter, not more than twenty-five percent of a REIT’s total assets could be 
represented by securities. Apparently, the value of the stock of the target 
corporation (which would be considered “securities” for this purpose) would be 
large enough such that the trust’s securities holdings would be in excess of twenty-
five percent of its total assets. See generally I.R.C. § 856(c)(4) (West Supp. 2001). 
 56. Pittsburgh Realty Inv. Trust, 67 T.C. at 266. 
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section 336 of the 1954 Code, “no gain or loss will result to the 
subsidiary . . . upon the disposition of its assets in complete 
liquidation.”57 
The Service issued a ruling that essentially granted the trust’s 
request as to its REIT qualification.58  One of the additional rulings 
stated that “[p]ursuant to section 336 of the Code, no gain or loss 
will be recognized to [the target corporation] upon the 
distribution of its property to [the trust] (except as provided in sections 
47, 453(d), 1245 and 1250 of the Code).”59  In addition, another 
ruling stated that “[p]ursuant to section 334(b)(2), the basis of the 
property of [the target corporation] received by [the trust] will be 
the adjusted basis of the shares of [the target corporation] 
Common with respect to which the distribution is made.”60  Around 
this time, the target corporation was liquidated as planned.61 
In litigation, the government asserted that the acquiring trust 
was the transferee of the target corporation and that the target 
corporation was liable for depreciation recapture gains from the 
disposition of depreciable property under section 1245 and on 
depreciable real property under section 1250.62  The acquiring trust 
did not challenge the existence of the tax liability, but claimed it 
could not be called upon to pay the liability, apparently believing 
the income tax liability should be borne by the selling 
shareholders.63  The trust asserted that, under the KD Doctrine, the 
substance of the transaction was a purchase of assets.64  The court 
disagreed, stating that the taxpayer’s attempt to re-characterize the 
transaction was precluded by the Danielson rule, the law of the 
circuit to which an appeal would be taken.65  Thus, absent a 
showing of fraud, mistake, or the like, the taxpayer was bound by 
the form of the transaction it had chosen.66  Moreover, the court 
 
 57. Id. at 267. 
 58. Id. at 268. 
 59. Id. (emphasis added). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 269. 
 62. Id. at 271. 
 63. Id. at 269. 
 64. Id. at 273-74. 
 65. Comm’r v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir. 1967) (explaining that a 
party can challenge the tax consequences of his agreement as construed by the 
Service only by adducing proof which in an action between the parties to the 
agreement would be admissible to alter that construction or to show its 
unenforceability because of mistake, undue influence, fraud, duress, etc.). 
 66. Pittsburgh Realty Inv. Trust, 67 T.C. at 274. 
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stated that neither Kimbell-Diamond nor its statutory counterpart 
(section 334(b)(2)) “warrants re-characterization of the transaction 
for other than basis purposes.  Quite simply, the fact that the 
transaction may be viewed in the basis context as a single-step asset 
purchase in no way vitiates the transfer element for purposes of 
section 6901 [the transferee liability provision].”67 The court noted 
that the section 334(b)(2) exception does not dispense with the 
fact that a liquidation has taken place.68 
c.  Scope of Section 334(b)(2) 
Pittsburgh Realty illustrates one reason why section 334(b)(2) of 
the 1954 Code was not as popular with taxpayers as the original KD 
Doctrine.  While former section 334(b)(2) generally provided a 
basis step-up in the target corporation assets equal to the cost of the 
stock, it did so in the context of a liquidation that was otherwise 
given effect for federal income tax purposes; and, as such, the 
depreciation recapture rules would override the general non-
recognition rules of former section 336.69  To be sure, former 
section 334(b)(2) represented a more mechanical, and objective, 
means of obtaining a stepped-up basis in a purchased corporation’s 
assets, rather than relying on such vagaries as intent.70  However, 
courts and practitioners disagreed on whether it was the exclusive 
means for a corporate purchaser to obtain a stepped-up basis in a 
purchased corporation’s assets or whether the KD Doctrine 
continued to remain viable in some contexts.71 
Would, for example, the KD Doctrine apply if a corporate 
purchaser took more than twelve months to complete its qualifying 
purchase?  In American Potash & Chemical Corp. v. United States,72 the 
purchaser took fourteen months to effect its acquisition of the 
target corporation.73  Although not specifically applying the KD 
Doctrine (it returned the case to the trial commissioner,) the Court 
of Claims stated that 1954 Code section 334(b)(2) was a safe 
 
 67. Id. at 276. 
 68. Id. (citing Cabax Mills v. Comm’r, 59 T.C. 401, 409 (1972)). 
 69. See I.R.C. § 336 (1954). 
 70. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-45-004 (Jul. 28, 1992) (stating section 334(b)(2) 
of the 1954 Code improved upon the KD Doctrine “because it provided 
predictable results”). 
 71. See Dolan, supra note 45, at 289 (discussing the reactions to the enactment 
of 334(b)(2)). 
 72. 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 1968). 
 73. Id. at 197. 
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harbor provision, and not a preemption of the KD Doctrine.74  
According to the Court of Claims, “the principle of section 
334(b)(2) is derived from the broader, more general rule of Kimbell-
Diamond,” and it is a precise, narrow and objective application of 
the broader doctrine.”75  Reviewing the legislative history of the 
provision, the Court of Claims also reasoned that: 
[W]e cannot conclude that Congress intended to 
differentiate between corporate and individual taxpayers 
and permit the use of the judicial Kimbell-Diamond 
doctrine by an individual who has acquired stock during a 
period in excess of twelve months, and to deny its 
application to a corporate taxpayer under the same 
circumstances.76 
 
Other courts, such as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
1980, entertained less doubt on the matter.  “[W]e hold definitively 
and absolutely that the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine is extinct under 
the 1954 code regarding corporate taxpayers.”77 
4.  Preemption/Codification in Section 338 
The operation of former section 334(b)(2) was unsatisfactory 
in many respects.  For example, it mandated the liquidation of the 
purchased corporation to qualify for the asset basis step-up.78  It 
provided a series of complex adjustments, which were subject to 
manipulation, for the period between a purchase and a 
liquidation.79  In part to combat the complexity of section 
334(b)(2), Congress repealed it in 1982 and enacted a new 
provision “intended to replace any non-statutory treatment of a 
 
 74. Id. at 198. 
 75. Id. at 208. 
 76. Id. 
 77. In re Chrome Plate, Inc., 614 F.2d 990, 1000 (5th Cir. 1980); see also 
Broadview Lumber Co. v. United States, 561 F.2d 698, 711-12 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(reversing the district court, the court found that Congress preempted the 
application of the KD Doctrine to corporate purchasers in the enactment of 
former section 334(b)(2)). 
 78. I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1954); see N.Y. Fruit Auction Corp. v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. 
564, 569-70 (1982) (stating neither former section 334(b)(2) nor the KD Doctrine 
is applicable where purchasing corporation merged downstream into acquired 
target corporation). 
 79. See BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 11.45 (4th ed. 1979) (discussing the KD 
Doctrine, section 334(b)(2) and the adoption of section 338). 
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stock purchase as an asset purchase under the Kimbell-Diamond 
doctrine.”80 
Section 338 is similar to former section 334(b)(2) in that it 
provides a means for a purchasing corporation to obtain a step-up 
in the basis of target corporation’s assets when the target 
corporation is acquired pursuant to a qualifying purchase.  Unlike 
former section 334(b)(2), however, the mechanism provided 
under section 338 is elective at the option of the purchaser, or is 
made jointly by the purchasing corporation and the seller in 
certain qualifying transactions.81 
Under section 338, a target corporation must be acquired in a 
“qualified stock purchase,” which generally means the acquisition 
of at least eighty percent of the outstanding stock of the target 
corporation in a purchase transaction.82  Only a corporation can 
make a qualified stock purchase; other non-corporate purchasers 
are ineligible.83  A purchasing corporation generally has up to nine-
and-a-half months to elect stepped-up basis treatment for the target 
corporation’s assets, following its acquisition.84  If it makes the 
election, a “new” target corporation is deemed to purchase all the 
target corporation assets from an unrelated party.  The “old” target 
corporation is deemed to sell all of its assets to an unrelated buyer.  
The cost of this step up, of course, is tax on the deemed sale, which 
 
 80. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-760, at 536 (1982). 
 81. I.R.C. § 338(h)(10) (CCH 2001); Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-1 (as 
amended in 2001). 
 82. A qualified stock purchase means any transaction or series of transactions 
in which stock (meeting the requirements of section 1504(a)(2)) of one 
corporation is acquired by another corporation by purchase during the twelve-
month acquisition period.  I.R.C. § 338(d)(3) (CCH 2001).  A purchase: 
[M]eans any acquisition of stock, but only if (i) the basis of the stock in 
the hands of the purchasing corporation is not determined (I) in whole 
or in part by reference to the adjusted basis of such stock in the hands of 
the person from whom acquired, or (II) under section 1014(a) (relating 
to property acquired from a decedent), (ii) the stock is not acquired in 
an exchange to which section 351, 354, 355, or 356 applies and is not 
acquired in any other transaction described in regulations in which the 
transferor does not recognize the entire amount of the gain or loss 
realized on the transaction, and (iii) the stock is not acquired from a 
person the ownership of whose stock would, under section 318(a) (other 
than paragraph (4) thereof), be attributed to the person acquiring such 
stock. 
I.R.C. § 338(h)(3) (CCH 2001).  In short, a purchase generally entails an 
acquisition of stock from an unrelated person in a taxable transaction.  Id. 
 83. Treas. Reg. § 1.338-3(b)(1) (2001). 
 84. Treas. Reg. § 1.338-2(d) (2001). 
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the buyer generally inherits when it acquires the target 
corporation.85  However, the availability of the election does not 
hinge upon the liquidation of the target corporation; the 
purchasing corporation may decide to keep the target corporation 
in existence indefinitely.86 
5.  Revenue Ruling 90-95 
In 1990, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 90-95,87 which 
squarely addressed the corporate KD Doctrine.  Revenue Ruling 90-
95 addresses two different factual situations.  In the first situation, 
the Service ruled that if an acquiring corporation organizes a 
subsidiary solely for the purpose of acquiring the stock of a target 
corporation in a reverse subsidiary cash merger,88 the acquiring 
corporation is treated as having acquired the stock of the target in 
a qualified stock purchase under section 338 of the Code. 
The other factual situation involves a classic Kimbell-Diamond 
transaction, in which an acquiring corporation acquires all of the 
stock of a target corporation (again, by means of a reverse cash 
merger as in the first situation) and immediately liquidates the 
target corporation as part of an integrated plan to acquire the 
target corporation’s assets, which was partly motivated by a state law 
that prohibited the acquiring corporation from owning the stock of 
the target corporation.89 
Addressing this second factual situation, the Service held that 
the acquiring corporation is treated as having acquired the stock in 
a qualified stock purchase under section 338, rather than having 
 
 85. This is generally true for a “regular” section 338(g) election.  However, 
when the purchasing corporation makes a joint election under section 338(h)(10) 
with the selling consolidated group, selling affiliate, or S corporation 
shareholders, the deemed sale tax consequences are generally borne by the sellers.  
See Treas. Reg. § 1.338-10(a) (2001); Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-1(d)(3) (2001). 
 86. See Treas. Reg. § 1.338-3(c) (2001) (discussing the effect of post-
acquisition events). 
 87. Rev. Rul. 90-95, 1990-2 C.B. 67 (1990). 
 88. A reverse subsidiary cash merger is a means by which one corporation can 
acquire another corporation in a taxable transaction.  Typically, it involves the 
formation of a wholly-owned subsidiary, which then merges into the target 
corporation, with the target corporation surviving and the target corporation 
shareholders receiving consideration comprised exclusively or mostly of cash or 
something other than stock.  The merger subsidiary’s life is brief and it is often 
treated as transitory for federal income tax purposes, as it was in Revenue Ruling 
90-95.  Id. 
 89. Id. 
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made an acquisition of assets pursuant to the KD Doctrine.90  The 
Service states that, under section 338, asset purchase treatment 
turns on whether a section 338 election is made (or is deemed 
made) following a qualified stock purchase of target stock and not 
on whether the target’s assets are acquired through a prompt 
liquidation of the target.  The ruling does not address non-
corporate purchasers.91 
Revenue Ruling 90-95 is therefore consistent with Congress’ 
intent to afford wide discretion to corporations to either make a 
section 338(g) election and obtain a cost basis in a target’s assets or 
not make a section 338(g) election and obtain a carryover basis in 
target’s assets.92  In this context, however, intent to obtain a cost 
basis may only be manifested through an election under section 
338. 
6.  Revenue Ruling 2001-46 
Revenue Ruling 2001-46 recently distinguished Revenue 
Ruling 90-95.93 In Revenue Ruling 2001-46, the Service again 
presented two factual situations. In the first situation, pursuant to 
an integrated plan, an acquiring corporation acquires all of the 
stock of a target corporation in a statutory merger of a newly 
formed merger subsidiary of the acquiring corporation into the 
target corporation (the “Acquisition Merger”).94  The shareholders 
of target exchange their target stock for a consideration mix of 
seventy percent acquiring corporation voting stock and thirty 
percent cash.95  As part of the same plan, target merges upstream 
into the acquiring corporation in a statutory merger (the 
“Upstream Merger.”)96 
The ruling assumes that, absent some prohibition against 
application of the step transaction doctrine, the Acquisition Merger 
and Upstream Merger would be treated as a single integrated 
acquisition by the acquiring corporation of all of the target 
corporation assets, as though the target corporation merged 
directly into the acquiring corporation. Thus, the Acquisition 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Rev. Rul. 2001-46, 2001-42 I.R.B. 1 (Sept. 24, 2001). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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Merger is effectively ignored, and the two steps are treated as a 
single statutory merger of the target corporation into the acquiring 
corporation in a transaction that qualifies as a reorganization 
under section 368(a)(1)(A). 
This approach is similar to that taken in Revenue Ruling 67-
274, where the acquiring corporation acquires all of the stock of 
the target corporation solely in exchange for acquiring corporation 
voting stock and, thereafter, target corporation completely 
liquidates into acquiring corporation.97  That ruling holds that 
because the two steps are parts of a plan of reorganization, they 
cannot be considered independently of each other.98  Thus, the 
steps do not qualify as a reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(B) 
followed by a liquidation under section 332, but instead qualify as a 
single acquisition of the target’s assets in a reorganization under 
section 368(a)(1)(C).99 
Thus, Revenue Ruling 2001-46 distinguishes the second 
situation of Revenue Ruling 90-95.100  Despite the fact that the 
Acquisition Merger, standing alone, would otherwise be treated as a 
qualified stock purchase under section 338(d)(3), Revenue Ruling 
2001-46 holds that, given the effect of the second step (the 
Upstream Merger) and the fact that the acquiring corporation 
would have a carryover basis in the target corporation assets when 
the two steps are integrated, “a section 338 election may not be 
made in such a situation.”101 
The Service explains that Revenue Ruling 90-95 rejects the 
approach reflected in Revenue Ruling 67-274 where the application 
of that approach would treat the purchase of a target corporation’s 
stock without a Section 338 election, followed by the liquidation or 
merger of the target corporation, as the purchase of the target 
corporation’s assets resulting in a cost basis in the assets under 
Section 1012.102  According to the Service, such an approach would 
be contrary to congressional intent that Section 338 “replaces any 
nonstatutory treatment of a stock purchase as an asset purchase 
under the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine.”103 
 
 97. See Rev. Rul. 67-274, 1967-2 C.B. 141 (1967) (defining corporate 
reorganization). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Rev. Rul. 2001-46, 2001-42 I.R.B. 1 (Sept. 24, 2001). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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In contrast, according to the Service, the policy underlying 
section 338 is not violated by treating the first situation of Rev. Rul. 
2001-46 as a single statutory merger of the target corporation into 
the acquiring corporation, because such treatment results in a 
transaction that qualifies as a reorganization under section 
368(a)(1)(A) in which the acquiring corporation acquires the 
assets of the target corporation with a carryover basis under section 
362 and does not result in a cost basis for those assets under 
Section 1012.104 
B.  The Non-corporate Kimbell-Diamond Doctrine 
The enactment of 1954 Code section 334(b)(2) and the 
subsequent enactment of section 338 have served to heighten the 
distinction between corporate purchasers and non-corporate 
purchasers in the application of the KD Doctrine.  Unlike 
corporate purchasers, the KD Doctrine as applied to non-corporate 
purchasers was never the subject of explicit statutory focus. 
1.  Cullen 
One of the first cases to affirm the KD Doctrine’s application 
to individuals was Cullen v. Commissioner, decided by the Tax Court 
in the same year as Kimbell-Diamond.105  In Cullen, Mr. Cullen held 
twenty-five percent of the stock of a corporation that bore his name 
and which was engaged in the business of manufacturing and 
selling orthopedic appliances.106  He acquired the remaining 
seventy-five percent of the shares by buying out the other 
shareholders and liquidated the corporation on the same day in 
which he acquired all of the remaining shares.107 
Mr. Cullen claimed a short-term capital loss with respect to the 
liquidation of the seventy-five percent interest that had been 
acquired through the buyout, based upon the book value of the 
distributed tangible assets.108  The Tax Court held that loss 
treatment was not warranted, concluding that the taxpayer had, 
after liquidation of the corporation, everything he paid for when 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. 14 T.C. 368 (1950), acq. 1950-2 C.B. 1. 
 106. Id. at 368-69. 
 107. Id. at 371. 
 108. Id. 
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he bought all the corporation’s stock.109  Citing Kimbell-Diamond, the 
Tax Court noted that the taxpayer’s purpose “was not to buy the 
stock as such . . . [but rather] to liquidate the corporation so that 
he could operate the business as a sole proprietorship.  The several 
steps employed in carrying out that purpose must be regarded as a 
single transaction for tax purposes.”110  Thus, Mr. Cullen was 
treated as purchasing seventy-five percent of the corporation’s 
assets directly, rather than receiving them as a result of a 
liquidating distribution.  In contrast, the Tax Court sustained a 
determination that liquidating proceeds received with respect to 
the twenty-five percent “old and cold” interest should be treated as 
long-term capital gain arising from the exchange of stock.111 
The court did not challenge the valuation of the tangible 
assets ascribed by Mr. Cullen, but rather treated the assets (at least 
seventy-five percent of them) as acquired directly.112  Thus, Mr. 
Cullen got what he paid for, and did not suffer a loss as to seventy-
five percent of the assets.  The court thus apparently adopted a 
bifurcated view of the liquidation, in which it was respected as to 
the “old and cold” twenty-five percent interest, but disregarded as 
to the remaining interest. 
2.  Snively 
Three years after Cullen, the Tax Court spoke approvingly of 
the application of the KD Doctrine to a situation where an 
individual taxpayer purchased all of the stock of a corporation and 
caused the corporation to liquidate within six months of the 
purchase, where the individual’s “intention right along was to 
dissolve” the target corporation.113  The Tax Court rejected the 
government’s contention that the separate existence of the 
corporation for a six-month period should be respected 
(apparently the purchase and liquidation occurred within the same 
taxable year as the individual taxpayer) and instead treated the 
transaction as a unified asset acquisition.114 
 
 109. Id. at 372-73. 
 110. Id. at 373 (citing Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 74 
(1950)). 
 111. Id. at 373.  The Tax Court disallowed the IRS’s attempt, however, to 
increase the amount of capital gain by attempting to add intangible assets to the 
proceeds received by the taxpayer.  Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Snively v. Comm’r, 19 T.C. 850, 859 (1953), acq. 1956-2 C.B. 8. 
 114. Id. at 858. 
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The case of Snively v. Commissioner115 involved the purchase by 
the individual taxpayer of all of the stock of Meloso, a corporation 
which owned and operated a citrus grove.116  The individual 
taxpayer, Mr. Snively, was advised by his attorney and accountant to 
liquidate the corporation upon its purchase.117  The stock of Meloso 
was delivered by the seller to an escrow agent in July of 1943.118  
The agent, which was also a bank, held the certificates as collateral 
for a loan, which was repaid in October 1943, at which time Mr. 
Snively received the stock certificates.119  Although the liquidation 
of the Meloso stock was originally intended to take place in July, 
1943, it was not formally dissolved until December 31, 1943.120  One 
of the issues before the Tax Court was whether income earned 
during the fall of 1943 should have been reported on Mr. Snively’s 
return or the corporation’s.121  The Tax Court held that the income 
earned during this period belonged to the corporation.  While the 
court agreed with Mr. Snively that he should be treated as directly 
acquiring the assets of Meloso, the court disagreed with his 
assertion that such treatment effectively prevented Meloso from 
earning, receiving or being taxed on income following the date of 
the stock purchase in July, 1943.122  The court stated: 
The stock purchase coupled with the intent to dissolve the 
corporation and the taking of some steps to that end, in 
our opinion did not ipso facto either destroy the existence 
of the corporation as a taxable entity or permit the 
petitioner to appropriate as his own income which would 
otherwise be taxable to the corporation.123 
 
Thus, while Meloso earned income during the fall of 1943, the 
court nevertheless held that the formal liquidation of the 
corporation on December 31, 1943 would be ignored for federal 
income tax purposes and Mr. Snively would be instead treated as 
directly purchasing assets.124  The court stated that the income 
 
 115. 19 T.C. 850 (1953). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 851. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 852. 
 120. Id. at 853. 
 121. Id. at 850. 
 122. Id. at 858. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.  Mr. Snively reported taxable gain with respect to the liquidation of 
Meloso on his 1943 return.  In the ensuing litigation, he claimed that position was 
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earned by Meloso during the fall of 1943 should be reported on 
Meloso’s return.125 
Originally, Mr. Snively reported long-term capital gain upon 
the liquidation of Meloso.126  Before the court, he argued this 
treatment was in error and the stock purchase and liquidation 
should be “taken as a single transaction,”127 citing Ashland Oil & 
Refining Co.128  The Tax Court found this assertion “well taken,”129 
noting that in Ashland Oil & Refining Co. “no taxable gain was 
realized on the liquidation.”130 
3.  Suter 
Estate of Suter v. Commissioner131 is another case applying the KD 
Doctrine to individuals who had reported short-term capital gain 
on their individual returns with respect to the liquidation of a 
recently acquired target corporation named Rondout.132  In Suter, 
three individuals desired to purchase a paper mill that operated in 
corporate solution.133  The seller, advised by tax attorneys, refused 
to allow the corporation to sell the assets directly but agreed to sell 
the stock.134  Approximately a month after the purchasers received 
the stock, they voted to sell Rondout, thus causing its liquidation.135  
Within a few days of the formal liquidation of Rondout, a new 
corporation with the same name was formed (“New” Rondout).136 
New Rondout was initially capitalized with relatively small 
amounts of cash contributed by each of the individuals in exchange 
for stock of New Rondout.137  These individuals then “sold” the 
assets they had received in liquidation of “Old” Rondout to New 
Rondout.138  Consideration for the latter consisted primarily of the 
 
in error.  Id. at 859 (citing Comm’r v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 
1938)). 
 125. Id. at 859. 
 126. Id. at 856. 
 127. Id. at 859. 
 128. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41. 
 129. Snively, 19 T.C. at 859. 
 130. Id. 
 131. 29 T.C. 244 (1957), acq. 1958-2 C.B. 8. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 247. 
 134. Id. at 247-48. 
 135. Id. at 250. 
 136. Id. at 251. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss4/8
04_BAKKE 4/18/2002  5:00 PM 
2002] DUSTING OFF KIMBALL-DIAMOND DOCTRINE 1465 
assumption by New Rondout of the purchase money indebtedness 
issued by the individuals in their purchase of the Old Rondout 
stock. 
The Service asserted that the transaction was a tax-free 
reorganization and that the individual purchasers received a 
dividend to the extent of current and accumulated earnings and 
profits of the old target corporation and the new target 
corporation.139  The Service argued that the new corporation thus 
had a carryover basis in the assets acquired from the old target 
corporation. 
The Tax Court disagreed with the reorganization assertion, 
since the shareholders of New Rondout were not the same 
shareholders as those of Old Rondout, and found that the new 
target corporation took a basis of $500,000 in the assets it received 
by way of the individual purchasers, which was the price they had 
paid for the stock.140  Interestingly, the Tax Court viewed New 
Rondout as the purchaser of the assets of Old Rondout. 
4.  Mattison 
The Service successfully invoked the KD Doctrine in United 
States v. Mattison.141  Here, Continental Oil Company negotiated to 
buy Westcott Oil Company, but the negotiations were not 
consummated because of a disagreement over price.142  Mr. 
Mattison, a Westcott shareholder, then obtained an offer from 
Continental to buy the operating assets of Westcott.143  Mattison 
purchased the remainder of the stock in Westcott and caused the 
corporation to distribute its operating assets in partial liquidation, 
which he reconveyed to a subsidiary of Continental, in exchange 
for cash.144  Mattison received the remaining assets within the next 
year and reported capital gains totaling approximately $123,000 
with respect to both taxable years as a result of the liquidation.145 
The Service appealed from a district court ruling that 
respected the liquidation.146  On appeal, the Service asserted the 
 
 139. Id. at 260. 
 140. Id. at 258-60. 
 141. United States v. Mattison, 273 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1959). 
 142. Id. at 15. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 15-16. 
 145. Id. at 16. 
 146. Mattison v. United States, 163 F.Supp. 754 (D. Idaho 1958). 
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KD Doctrine, arguing that Mattison had purchased the assets from 
Westcott which he subsequently sold to Continental.147  The Service 
asserted that the lump sum purchase price should be allocated 
across all of the assets and that the cash should have a basis equal to 
its value.148  Viewed this way, certain non-liquid assets had a lower 
basis in Mattison’s hands, resulting in a greater taxable gain to 
Mattison upon the subsequent asset sale to Continental than was 
treated as gain realized in liquidation. 
The Ninth Circuit, noting the liquidation treatment used by 
Mattison, stated: 
There is, however, an established exception to the rule 
giving effect to liquidating distributions, which is known 
as the Kimbell-Diamond rule.  Under this doctrine, when a 
taxpayer who is interested primarily in a corporation’s 
assets first purchases the stock and then liquidates the 
corporation in order to acquire the desired assets, the 
separate steps taken to accomplish the primary objective 
will be treated as a single transaction.149  
 
The appellate court thus agreed with the Service that the KD 
Doctrine applied and that Mattison should be treated as having 
purchased the assets from Westcott, with no significance given to 
the formal liquidation of Westcott.150 
5.  Griswold 
In Griswold v. Commissioner,151 the Fifth Circuit decided the KD 
Doctrine’s applicability to a case involving two individual 
purchasers, who, upon advice of their accountant, sought to obtain 
a stepped-up basis in the assets of a target corporation by 
invocation of the KD Doctrine.152  The individual purchasers, 
majority shareholders in cigarette vending machine companies, 
acquired the stock of Independent Cigarette Service, Inc. 
(“Independent”) for cash and notes, as the sellers of Independent 
would not sell the assets directly.153  The notes were put into escrow, 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 757. 
 149. United States v. Mattison, 273 F.2d 13, 17 (9th Cir. 1959). 
 150. Id. at 18. 
 151. Griswold v. Comm’r, 400 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1968). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 431. 
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along with the stock of Independent as collateral.154  However, 
under the terms of the purchase agreement, the corporate 
existence of Independent was to be maintained at all times.155  
Although Independent was actually liquidated about nine months 
after the purchase, the government claimed that the KD Doctrine 
did not apply because the purchase agreement itself expressly 
provided that Independent was to retain its corporate identity.156  
The Tax Court agreed with this argument.157 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit concurred.158  It rejected the 
taxpayers’ argument that they had instructed their attorney, when 
he was drafting the purchase agreement, that they wished to 
liquidate the corporation, and that the court should thus recognize 
the “intent” of the taxpayers.159  The appellate court stated that 
while evidence of a single, integrated transaction may be shown 
from circumstances other than formal agreements, it did not 
believe the contents of such agreements could simply be ignored.160  
Accordingly, it accepted the Tax Court’s finding that the taxpayers 
did not engage in or consummate a single, integrated transaction 
to acquire the assets of Independent.161  Since the assets were 
reincorporated into a new corporation, the Fifth Circuit concluded 
that the overall transaction was a tax-free reorganization under 
section 368(a)(1)(D) and (F).162 
6.  Other Rulings 
The KD Doctrine became commonplace, even with regard to 
non-corporate purchasers.  Thus, in Fox & Hounds, Inc. v. 
Commissioner,163 there was no dispute that the KD Doctrine applied, 
where individual purchasers acquired all of the stock of a target 
corporation and then promptly liquidated the corporation, with 
 
 154. Id. at 428. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 435. 
 157. Griswold v. Comm’r, 45 T.C. 463, 473-74 (1966). 
 158. Griswold, 400 F.2d at 431-32. 
 159. Id. at 432. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id.  See generally Brian B. Gibney, Liquidation-Reincorporation and Fictional 
Stock in Related Corporation Asset Transfers, 81 J. TAX’N 144 (1994) (discussing 
various tax consequences that attend the liquidation of a subsidiary and 
reincorporation of the assets into a newly-formed corporation). 
 163. Fox & Hounds, Inc. v. Comm’r, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1216 (1962). 
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their intent evidenced in the purchase agreement.164  The issue in 
Fox & Hounds went simply to the allocation of costs (basis) and 
whether the purchasers were required to shift the allocation of the 
purchase price from depreciable assets to goodwill, for which no 
amortization deductions were generally available at that time.165  In 
addition, while other courts wrestled with whether the corporate 
KD Doctrine had been completely preempted by 1954 Code 
section 334(b)(2), there was very little, if any, debate about the 
viability of the non-corporate KD Doctrine.166  Nevertheless, the 
courts continued to insist upon the requisite elements: as in 
Griswold, the individual purchasers must acquire their target 
corporation stock for the sole purpose of liquidating the target 
corporation in order to reach its assets.167 
The non-corporate KD Doctrine was to be found in rulings 
from the Service, as well.  In Revenue Ruling 69-242,168 the 
individual taxpayer, as a result of a public condemnation of his real 
estate, desired to acquire certain other real estate to qualify for a 
tax-free exchange under the rule of then-existing section 1033.169  
The desired property was an asset of a corporation.  While the 
corporation would not sell the asset directly to the taxpayer, it did 
offer to sell its stock.  Pursuant to a prearranged plan, the taxpayer 
purchased the stock and promptly liquidated the corporation.  If 
the taxpayer were treated as purchasing stock, he would recognize 
a certain amount of gain under section 1033; however, if the 
taxpayer were treated as purchasing assets, he would recognize no 
gain.  Citing Suter and Cullen, the ruling notes that: 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.  Cf. I.R.C. § 197 (CCH 2001) (providing a fifteen-year amortization 
period for goodwill and enacted in 1993).  Statements of the pre-section 197 status 
of goodwill still exist in regulations.  Id.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (2000) (“No 
deduction for depreciation is allowable with respect to goodwill.”). 
 166. See, e.g., Am. Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 
1968) (“The Kimbell-Diamond doctrine, without question, remains viable for 
individual taxpayers because section 334(b)(2) is applicable only to corporate 
taxpayers.”). 
 167. See Lang v. Comm’r, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 874 (1982) (holding that KD 
Doctrine did not give individuals (or the newly formed corporation) an asset basis 
step-up, where target corporation was not liquidated until nearly three years after 
its purchase by individuals, followed by the prompt reincorporation of the assets 
into a newly formed corporation; tax-free reorganization rules applied). 
 168. Rev. Rul. 69-242, 1969-1 C.B. 200. 
 169. Id.  Section 1033 still generally provides tax-free treatment for 
condemned property that is exchanged for qualified replacement property.  I.R.C. 
§ 1033 (2001). 
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In cases involving individuals who have acquired the stock 
of a corporation and then liquidated the newly acquired 
corporation pursuant to a prearranged plan, it has been 
held that no gain or loss was recognized on such 
liquidations on the theory that the transaction is in 
essence an acquisition of assets.170 
The Service concluded that the taxpayer purchased the assets 
since his purpose in acquiring the corporation’s stock was to 
acquire its assets directly.  No mention was made about the 
application of recapture provisions such as sections 1245 or 1250.171 
Private rulings of the Service also affirmed the relevance of the 
non-corporate KD Doctrine.  In one such ruling,172 the Service 
ruled that the purchase by a partnership (“Partnership I”) of the 
stock of another corporation (“Corp I”), followed by the transfer of 
such stock to another partnership (“Partnership VII”) would be 
treated as the purchase of assets of the corporation followed by the 
transfer of such assets to Partnership VII.  In its ruling, the Service 
noted that “sufficient facts have been submitted which indicate that 
Partnership I intended to liquidate Corp I at the time of the stock 
purchase so as to acquire thereby the underlying assets of Corp 
I.”173  Thus, the ruling explicitly ignores the transfer by Partnership 
I of its stock interest in Corp I “because of the absence of any 
evident business purpose motivating such transfer.”174  However, 
from the seller’s side, the Service stated that sale of the Corp I stock 
“will nevertheless be respected as such.”175 
In another ruling issued about a year later,176 the Service ruled 
that the purchase of all of the stock of Target corporation followed 
by its planned merger into the Purchaser would be treated as a 
purchase of Target’s assets, where the Purchaser was an “S” 
 
 170. Rev. Rul. 69-242, 1969-1 C.B. 200, 201 (citing Estate of Suter v. Comm’r, 
29 T.C. 244 (1957); Cullen v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 368 (1950)). 
 171. In this regard, the revenue ruling is similar to a private ruling issued in 
1966, which reached a similar conclusion regarding the treatment of the stock 
acquisition and liquidation as an asset purchase for section 1033 purposes.  See 
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6610205770A (Oct. 20, 1966) (expressing no opinion as to the 
applicability of section 1250). 
 172. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-17-056 (Jan. 28, 1987).  Although private letter rulings 
do not carry precedential status, they nonetheless reflect the Service’s reasoning 
on a particular fact situation.  See I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (CCH 2001). 
 173. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-17-056 (Jan. 28, 1987). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-18-049 (May 6, 1988) revoked by Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-23-024 
(June 11, 1993). 
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corporation and was treated as an individual, and thus ineligible to 
make a qualified stock purchase under section 338.177  The ruling 
cites Revenue Ruling 69-242 for this proposition.178  In this private 
ruling, the Service also ruled that the shareholders of Target would 
be treated as having sold their shares of Target stock to Purchaser 
and will recognize gain or loss accordingly under section 1001.  
The Service ruled no gain or loss would be recognized by Target 
under section 336 because of the deemed asset sale.179  It should be 
noted that this ruling was revoked in 1993, with no rationale given 
other than the earlier ruling “was in error.”180 
III.  CURRENT STATE OF THE NON-CORPORATE KD DOCTRINE 
A.  Scope of the Doctrine 
As illustrated above, the corporate KD Doctrine has been 
largely preempted by section 338.181  The non-corporate KD 
 
 177. During the years at issue, section 1371 provided that for “purposes of 
Subchapter C, an S corporation in its capacity as a shareholder of another 
corporation shall be treated as an individual.”  I.R.C. § 1371(a)(2) (prior to repeal 
by Pub. L. No. 104-188, Aug. 20, 1996). Later rulings, however, allowed an S 
corporation to make a section 338 election.  See Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-45-004 (Jul. 
28, 1992). 
 178. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-18-049, supra note 176.  The ruling also cites In re Chrome 
Plate, 614 F.2d 990, 1000 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 179. However, this arose in a pre-General Utilities repeal context.  See infra notes 
199-205 and accompanying text. 
 180. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-23-024 (June 11, 1993).  One interpretation is that the 
Service simply changed its mind regarding the ability of an S corporation to make 
a qualified stock purchase.  This was the position explicitly adopted in Technical 
Advice Memorandum 92-45-004 (S corporation can make a qualified stock 
purchase and an election under I.R.C. § 338).  Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-45-004 (Nov. 6, 
1992).  See MARTIN GINSBURG & JACK LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS & BUYOUTS ¶ 
1105.6.1 at 11-108 (June 2001 ed.) [hereinafter GINSBURG & LEVIN] (stating the 
Service’s initial determination in Private Letter Ruling 88-18-049 was “wildly 
wrong”). 
 181. However, this is not to suggest that no vestiges of the KD Doctrine remain 
for corporate purchasers.  On one hand, and somewhat ironically, the KD 
Doctrine remains vibrant in the tax-free reorganization context.  See Rev. Rul. 67-
274, 1967-2 C.B. 141 (describing acquisition of all of the stock of a target 
corporation in exchange for acquiring corporation voting stock, followed by a 
prompt liquidation of the target, treated as a unitary stock-for-assets acquisition by 
the acquiring corporation and a tax-free reorganization under section 
368(a)(1)(C)).  The Service subsequently explained, in Revenue Ruling 74-35, 
that, although Revenue Ruling 67-274 “makes no reference to Kimbell-Diamond, the 
holding that the initial acquisition of stock is to be disregarded as transitory and 
that the transaction is to be treated as an acquisition of assets represents an 
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Doctrine, in contrast, has not been specifically preempted, and 
presumably remains a viable doctrine.  However, as discussed 
below, depending upon the scope of the non-corporate KD 
Doctrine, certain factors may mitigate the practical effect of its 
viability. 
One of the critical inquiries in assessing the practical effect of 
the continued viability of the non-corporate KD Doctrine is the 
extent to which the doctrine ignores or respects the liquidation 
event.  On one hand, there are cases, such as Pittsburgh Realty 
Investment Trust, that suggest a more limited view of the doctrine’s 
effect, in that it applies to ignore the liquidation for basis step-up 
purposes only, but that the liquidation event retains independent 
significance for other purposes (such as transferee liability, as in 
Pittsburgh Realty Investment Trust).182 
However, one must keep in mind that while former section 
334(b)(2) was meant to effectuate the “principles” of Kimbell-
Diamond,183 it was not simply a wholesale codification of the KD 
Doctrine.  Thus, rather than suggesting a narrow view of the KD 
Doctrine (one in which the unitary asset transaction exists for basis 
purposes only), the court in Pittsburgh Realty Investment Trust might 
be viewed as simply construing former section 334(b)(2), which 
always operated within the context of a corporate liquidation and 
by its terms required recapture and not the KD Doctrine as such 
(or at least the non-corporate KD Doctrine).  If however, the 
 
application of the Kimbell-Diamond principle.”  Rev. Rul. 74-35, 1974-1 C.B. 85.  
“Under that principle, whenever a corporation acquires all the stock of another 
corporation pursuant to a prearranged plan to liquidate that corporation in order 
to acquire its assets, the transaction is treated, as to the acquiring corporation, as 
an acquisition of assets.”  Id. 
Consider also the situation where a corporation purchases for cash a large amount 
of stock (say, seventy percent) of a target corporation with the intent to acquire 
seventy percent of its assets. If the purchase does not constitute a qualified stock 
purchase within the meaning of section 338(d)(3) (and does not constitute a 
section 368 reorganization), could the purchasing corporation invoke the KD 
doctrine to treat its acquisition of the target corporation assets pursuant to a 
prompt liquidation of target as a direct purchase of the assets?  See, e.g., Tech. Adv. 
Mem. 97-42-039 (Apr. 2, 1997) (explaining acquisition of target stock does not 
qualify for “purchase” treatment under section 338(h)(3) and apparently is not 
acquired in a tax-free reorganization either); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-04-025 
(Oct. 29, 1999) (describing that the acquisition of less than all of the stock of a 
target corporation, followed by its dissolution in which the acquiring corporation 
did not acquire all of the target’s assets, will be treated as a direct transfer of assets 
that qualifies as a tax-free reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(D)). 
 182. See supra notes 51-68 and accompanying text. 
 183. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text. 
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Pittsburgh Realty Investment Trust view applies to the KD Doctrine 
generally (including the non-corporate KD Doctrine) then its 
continued viability may not have any more practical effect than 
following the current statutory regime governing liquidations.  This 
is because, under the current liquidation provisions, property 
received by a non-corporate shareholder in a distribution in 
complete liquidation in which gain or loss is recognized takes as its 
basis the fair market value of the property at the time of the 
distribution.184 
This limited view of the doctrine (in which the liquidation 
event is respected for other purposes) may be seen in rulings from 
the Service.  For example, in relatively recent private rulings, the 
Service has ruled that a two-step acquisition following the Kimbell-
Diamond model may be viewed as a direct asset acquisition.  In one 
ruling,185 an acquiring corporation acquired all of the stock of a 
target corporation through a tax-free reverse triangular merger 
under section 368(a)(2)(E) (“Acquisition Merger,”) although “it 
was desired to have the businesses of the two corporation [sic] 
operated in a single corporation.”186  For various reasons, it could 
not acquire the target corporation assets directly.187  When these 
impediments are removed, however, it proposes to merge the 
target corporation “upstream” into the acquiring corporation 
(“Upstream Merger”), much as described in Revenue Ruling 2001-
46.  The Service rules that this two-step acquisition will be treated as 
though the acquiring corporation acquired the target assets 
directly, citing Revenue Ruling 67-274. 
In addition, the Service also ruled that, for the period between 
the Acquisition Merger and the Upstream Merger, the target 
corporation “will be treated for tax purposes as remaining in 
existence” and will accordingly be included in the acquiring 
corporation’s consolidated return until the end of the date of the 
Upstream Merger.188  Such a ruling affirms the principle that the 
 
 184. I.R.C. § 334(a) (CCH 2001). 
 185. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-15-013 (Apr. 16, 1999). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Such reasons often involve complications with the assignability of valuable 
target corporation contacts, for example. 
 188. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-15-013 (Apr. 6, 1999) (holdings 1, 4); see also Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 98-40-004 (Oct. 2, 1998) (similar).  These rulings reflect a reversal of an 
earlier position of the Service, in that the target corporation did not become a 
member of the acquiring corporation’s consolidated group during the period 
preceding the liquidation.  See Tech. Adv. Mem. 88-37-003 (Sept. 16, 1988); see also 
ANDREW J. DUBROFF ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS FILING 
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separate existence of a corporation, apart from its shareholders, is 
generally unquestioned189 and forms the premise for the corporate 
liquidation provisions of the tax code.190 
On the other hand, there is a line of cases, such as Mattison, 
that clearly state from the purchaser’s perspective the formal 
liquidation event is not a taxable event for federal income tax 
purposes191 and the purchaser is simply treated as acquiring assets 
directly from an unrelated seller.192  Revenue Ruling 69-242 might 
also be viewed as illustrative of this broader application of the KD 
Doctrine, in which the liquidation event is simply ignored.  Recall 
that no mention was made of depreciation recapture in that ruling 
and the ruling held that the substance of the transaction was that 
the relevant property was directly acquired for federal income tax 
purposes. 
As the example in the beginning of this Article illustrates, to 
the extent the non-corporate KD Doctrine is viewed in this broader 
fashion, it would have a significant practical effect, particularly 
where the aggregate basis of the assets “inside” the acquired target 
corporation is relatively low compared to the fair market value of 
the assets. 
B.  Factors Affecting Viability 
It is clear that the basic corporate KD Doctrine193 has been 
preempted by section 338 and the regulations thereunder.194  
Congress and the Service have reiterated that form controls where 
an acquiring corporation acquires all of the stock of Target in a 
 
CONSOLIDATED RETURNS § 11.03 (2d ed. Oct. 2000). 
 189. See Moline Props., Inc. v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943) 
(explaining corporation generally treated as a separate taxable entity, although it 
may be disregarded when its formation or existence is a sham). 
 190. See generally I.R.C. §§ 331-337 (CCH 2001). 
 191. See United States v. Mattison, 273 F.2d 13, 22 n.11 (9th Cir. 1959). 
 192. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.338-1(a)(1) (2001) (describing that as a consequence 
of a section 338 election, a “new” target corporation is treated as acquiring all of 
its assets from an unrelated person). 
 193. “Basic” should be read to be synonymous with qualified stock purchase; 
i.e., the application of the KD Doctrine in a situation where a corporation has 
engaged in a qualified stock purchase within the meaning of I.R.C. section 
338(d)(3). 
 194. Somewhat ironically, if the actual facts of the Kimbell-Diamond case were to 
arise today, the separate steps (i.e., the acquisition and the liquidation) would be 
respected, as the Kimbell-Diamond Milling Company originally desired.  See Rev. 
Rul. 90-95, 1990-2 C.B. 67; cf. Rev. Rul. 2001-46, 2001-42 I.R.B. 1 (Sept. 25, 2001). 
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qualified stock purchase and then liquidates Target; i.e., each of 
two steps (the purchase and the liquidating distribution) are given 
independent significance, as long as the overall transaction would 
not qualify as a section 368 reorganization under the rationale of 
Revenue Ruling 2001-46).  While Kimbell-Diamond generated 
hundreds of citations over the course of five decades, relatively few 
have been made since the 1980s, a phenomenon that is in accord 
with all the congressional and judicial announcements of its 
preemption and extinction. 
But what does the dearth of citations say of the con-corporate 
KD Doctrine?  Does it suggest that it is extinct as well?195  When the 
Fifth Circuit in Chrome Plate spoke of the extinction of the KD 
Doctrine, it was speaking with regard to “corporate taxpayers.”196  
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit noted that the Court of Claims was 
troubled, in American Potash, by the fact that Congress would 
preempt the KD Doctrine in enacting section 334(b)(2) of the 
1954 Code, but leave it available for individual or non-corporate 
taxpayers.197  It stated that “Congress either ignored or chose to 
exclude the individual taxpayers, but we may not assume from 
either alternative that this court thus has the right to equalize the 
situation.  Congress has specifically provided for corporate 
taxpayers, and we are bound by that legislation.”198What follows is a 
brief discussion of factors affecting the continued viability of the 
KD Doctrine to non-corporate purchasers. 
1.  Repeal of General Utilities 
Probably the most significant development in corporate 
income tax law since the observation made by the Chrome Plate 
court has been the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine,199 which 
represents the biggest cloud over the continued viability of the 
Non-corporate KD Doctrine.  Under the General Utilities doctrine, 
later codified in section 311 of the 1954 Code, corporations were 
generally able to make distributions of appreciated property to 
their shareholders without the recognition of gain at the corporate 
level, with exceptions added over time for certain recapture items.  
 
 195. See In re Chrome Plate, 614 F.2d 990, 1000 (5th Cir. 1980) 
 196. Id. (emphasis added). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. So named for the holding in General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering.  
296 U.S. 200 (1935). 
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With the repeal of this doctrine, as part of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, Congress generally endorsed a double-tax system for 
distributions of appreciated property: i.e., the imposition of tax 
upon gain at the corporate level upon distribution and the 
imposition of tax at the shareholder level upon receipt of such 
property.200  This treatment extended not only to liquidations, but 
to ordinary dividend distributions, too.201 
The repeal of General Utilities may be thought to have also 
repealed the KD Doctrine.  Generally, when the KD Doctrine was 
applied, the target corporation’s distribution of property in 
liquidation was effectively ignored.202  Thus, if the KD Doctrine 
remains viable, it presents a way of avoiding corporate-level 
taxation.203 
Significantly, there has not been a reported case involving the 
non-corporate KD Doctrine since the repeal of General Utilities.  
This may well reflect an implicit recognition that the operating 
assumptions existing when cases such as Suter, Snively, and Cullen 
arose do not exist anymore, bringing the validity of such cases into 
 
 200. See I.R.C. § 301 (CCH 2001); cf. I.R.C. § 355 (CCH 2001) (providing a 
mechanism for a corporation to spin off a controlled subsidiary with no corporate 
or shareholder level gain recognition).  See generally BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 
16, ¶ 8.20 (discussing the General Utilities doctrine and its repeal). 
 201. See I.R.C. § 311(b); I.R.C. § 336 (CCH 2001).  Congress retained the 
model by which liquidating distributions to a parent corporation shareholder that 
held at least eighty percent of the liquidating corporation’s stock would continue 
to generally be a nonrecognition event.  See I.R.C. §§ 332(a), 334(b), 337(a) (CCH 
2001). 
 202. See, e.g., Robert Willens, Recent IRS Rulings Give ‘Kimbell-Diamond’ Doctrine 
Continuing Vitality, 2001 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) 202, J-1 (Oct. 22, 2001) (describing 
that, while the KD Doctrine may continue to be viable, in light of General Utilities 
repeal, the acquisition of target corporation assets “is certainly taxable”); David S. 
Miller, The Devolution and Inevitable Extinction of the Continuity of Interest Doctrine, 3 
FLA. TAX REV. 187, 234 (1996) (describing that after “repeal of General Utilities, an 
acquiror cannot make a qualified stock purchase, decline to make a section 338 
election, merge the target into acquiror’s wholly-owned subsidiary, and simply 
claim a cost basis in target’s stock”); Benjamin G. Wells, Does the Asset Acquisition 
Doctrine Apply after TRA ‘86?, 69 J. TAX’N 386, 389 (1988) (explaining “[t]he repeal 
of the General Utilities [doctrine] for corporate liquidations represents a 
determination that there should be no step-up in the basis of [target corporation] 
assets without recognition of a corporate level tax”); cf. GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra 
note 180, ¶ 208.3 at 2-225 (discussing implications of Private Letter Ruling 88-18-
049, authors suggest that KD Doctrine still lives, particularly the non-corporate KD 
Doctrine). 
 203. See supra Part I.A. (describing a transaction that involves only a single 
level of taxation: i.e., upon the shareholders of Target if their stock in Target is 
appreciated).  See generally I.R.C. § 1001 (West 2001). 
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question.  Before the repeal of General Utilities, a liquidating 
corporation generally did not recognize gain or loss upon the 
distribution of property in complete liquidation, except for LIFO 
recapture amounts.204  Presumably, this is the reason that the 
Service has not issued rulings in this area.  It may also explain why 
one of the last rulings to apply the non-corporate KD Doctrine was 
within the transition period provided by the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, in which liquidating distributions could continue to be made 
without corporate-level taxation.205 
2.  Lack of Explicit Repeal 
The strongest counter-argument to the notion that the non-
corporate KD Doctrine has been repealed through the repeal of 
General Utilities is the fact that it has not been explicitly repealed.  
Simply put, Suter, Snively, Cullen, and others like them, have not 
been overruled, and the Service has not withdrawn its published 
acquiescence to these decisions.  In addition, Revenue Ruling 69-
242 has not been modified or revoked. 
Moreover, the Service, even after the repeal of General Utilities, 
seems to acknowledge that the non-corporate KD Doctrine might 
be available.  On this point, the discussion by the Service in a 1992 
technical advice memorandum is telling.206 The primary issue 
discussed therein207 was whether an S corporation should be treated 
as a corporation when it acquires the stock of a target corporation 
and promptly liquidates the target.208  If the purchaser in this 
context is not treated as a corporation, then the S corporation 
shareholders (typically, individuals) are treated as the purchasers.209  
The Service discussed the KD Doctrine, former section 334(b)(2), 
the enactment of section 338, and the enactment in 1982 of a 
provision that provided an S corporation in its capacity as a 
shareholder of another corporation is treated as an individual, for 
 
 204. See I.R.C. § 336 (West 1954). 
 205. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-17-056 (Jan. 28, 1987) (conditioning ruling on the 
liquidation of Corp I occurring before January 1, 1987, lest such delay would cause 
corporate-level gain or loss to be recognized); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-514, § 631(a), 100 Stat. 2085 at § 631(a) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. 
§ 336 (2001)). 
 206. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-45-004 (July 28, 1992). 
 207. Id. 
 208. See supra notes 173-179 and accompanying text. 
 209. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-45-004, supra note 206. 
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purposes of subchapter C of the Code.210  Noting that this provision 
was enacted less than two months after the enactment of section 
338, the Service stated that “[w]e do not believe that Congress 
intended to return S corporations to the law as it existed before the 
1954 Code, when it was necessary to ascertain the intent of the 
acquiring corporation at the time of the stock purchase in order to 
determine whether the transaction would be treated as an asset 
purchase.”211 
Thus, although the Service concludes that an S corporation 
should be treated as a corporation (and thus subject to section 338 
and regulations underlying) it implicitly acknowledged that the 
non-corporate KD Doctrine remains viable.  However, the Service 
also determined that such a conclusion would not “give rise to 
abuse under today’s federal tax system, such as the avoidance of 
General Utilities gain,” since any built-in gain in the target 
corporation assets would carry over to the acquiring corporation 
under section 332 and 334.212  Because of the repeal of General 
Utilities, it is likely that the Service would come to a different 
conclusion under different facts (involving a non-corporate 
purchaser) if gain is avoided altogether through invocation of the 
non-corporate KD Doctrine. 
The fundamental fact remains that the legislative history of 
section 338 and the pronouncement of the Chrome Plate court,213 
which involve explicit declarations of the revocation of the KD 
Doctrine, involved contexts of traditional application: where a 
corporate purchaser acquires all of the stock of a target corporation 
and promptly liquidates the target.214  No discussion exists in the 
section 338 legislative history regarding non-corporate purchasers 
because section 338 by definition, was limited to corporate 
purchasers and the application of the KD Doctrine to individuals 
and other non-corporate purchasers was never codified.215  In 
 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. See supra note 2. 
 214. I.R.C. § 338(d)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.338-3(b)(1) (2001). 
 215. Moreover, under the “reenactment doctrine,” Congress’s reenactment 
without significant change of a statutory provision that has been the subject of 
judicial construction might be viewed as giving legislative imprimatur to such 
interpretation.  See Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 153 (1924) (stating that when 
“adopting the language used in an earlier act, Congress [is] considered to have 
adopted [the same language adopted by the court], and to have made it part of 
the enactment”). 
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addition, while federal income tax law is intensely statutory, it is 
also informed by a rich history of non-statutory principles.216  
Therefore, its judicial interpretations are not exempt from stare 
decisis.217 
Finally, significant administrative materials are on record as 
endorsing the non-corporate KD Doctrine.  Chief among these 
materials is Revenue Ruling 69-242, in which the Service affirmed 
the notion that no gain or loss would be recognized upon the 
liquidation of the acquired corporation where such corporation 
was acquired with a view toward obtaining its assets as qualified 
replacement property.  Although Revenue Ruling 69-242 addressed 
the application of the non-corporate KD Doctrine in the context of 
section 1033, the ruling nevertheless clearly holds that the 
purchaser is treated as purchasing assets, and not stock.218 
In this sense, Revenue Ruling 69-242 resembles Kimbell-
Diamond itself, which involved the purchaser’s basis in qualified 
replacement property under the predecessor to section 1033.  
Moreover, Congress granted the Service and Treasury rulemaking 
authority “as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the 
purposes” of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, including regulations “to 
ensure that such purposes may not be circumvented through the 
use of any provision of law or regulations . . . .”219  Presumably, 
Treasury and the Service have the authority to issue regulations 
that would deny invocation of the non-corporate KD Doctrine in 
order to avoid corporate-level taxation under section 336.220  To 
date, however, no regulations have been proposed or finalized. 
3.  Lack of a Complete Model; Whipsaw 
The KD Doctrine is not a complete model.  One of its more 
troubling aspects is that it does not adequately explain what 
 
 216. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935) (showing the 
classic substance-over-form case often cited for the proposition that how a 
transaction is viewed for tax purposes does not depend simply upon the literal 
compliance with the text of a statute, but must be informed by the underlying 
purposes of the law as well). 
 217. See generally, Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies 
Grow up to be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 520-54 (1994) (arguing that tax law 
practitioners would be better served by not viewing tax law as wholly different from 
other non-tax law). 
 218. Id. 
 219. I.R.C. § 337(d) (CCH 2001). 
 220. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.337(d)-4 (1998) (requiring gain recognition upon 
the conversion of a taxable entity to a tax-exempt entity). 
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happens to the selling shareholders.  When a purchaser invokes the 
KD Doctrine, and asserts that its acquisition is actually a direct asset 
purchase for federal income tax purposes, the seller is almost 
certainly treating the “other side” of the transaction as a sale of 
corporate stock.  Purists are left to ask: “What happened to the 
target corporation?  How (and when) did it simply disappear?”  
This is not an insignificant concern for a system that places a great 
premium upon internal symmetry and consistency.221  Thus, if the 
effect of the continued application of the non-corporate Doctrine 
is that, as in Snively, the liquidation exchange between the 
shareholder and the corporation is not a taxable exchange, and 
from the seller’s perspective the transaction is viewed simply as a 
stock sale, then the non-corporate KD Doctrine presents significant 
dissymmetry. 
This inconsistent treatment of both sides of the same 
transaction presents “whipsaw” concerns, in that both sides of a 
transaction are not treating it the same way.  Generally, the 
administration of the federal income tax system requires consistent 
treatment by parties to the transaction to avoid “whipsaw,” where 
parties might claim inconsistent characterizations, each to their 
respective advantage.  This is, in some respects, a variation of the 
General Utilities-repeal concern expressed above: if a seller is able to 
treat a transaction as a stock sale and the buyer is able to treat the 
same transaction as an asset purchase, what happens to the 
corporation in the meantime?  In the “post-General Utilities repeal 
world, a corporate liquidation is not a transaction step that can be 
glossed over.”222 
Troubling as these issues might be for those desiring a 
complete model, they are not new.223  Such inconsistencies may be 
found in the original application of the KD Doctrine.  For example, 
in Dallas Downtown Development Co. v. Commissioner,224 the 
government pursued the sellers of a target corporation that was 
acquired and liquidated under the theory that the corporation had 
 
 221. See Comm’r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., 508 U.S. 152, 159 (1993) (stating 
“the [Internal Revenue] Code must be given ‘as great an internal symmetry and 
consistency as its words permit.’”) (quoting Comm’r v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 304 
(1961)). 
 222. GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 180, ¶ 208.3 at 2-226. 
 223. See id. ¶ 608.4 at 6-108 (discussing instances in which both parties do not 
treat the transaction the same way for tax purposes). 
 224. Dallas Downtown Dev. Co. v. Comm’r, 12 T.C. 114 (1949). 
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sold assets when they had in fact sold stock.225  The Tax Court 
disagreed and found the selling shareholders had engaged in a 
stock sale.226 
Moreover, the Service has issued rulings that do not present a 
complete model in a somewhat similar factual setting.  For 
example, in Revenue Ruling 99-6,227 the Service describes the 
federal income tax consequences that arise when a partner in a 
partnership sells his or her half interest in the partnership to the 
remaining partner who owns the other half of the partnership, thus 
causing a termination of the partnership under section 
708(b)(1)(A).228  The Service ruled that the selling partner is 
treated as though he or she sold his or her partnership interest, i.e., 
the tax consequences follow the form.229  Because of this 
termination, the partnership is treated as liquidating, distributing 
all of its assets to the purchasing partner.230 
With little explanation, however, the Service then proffers that 
the purchasing partner is treated as though he bought assets, 
taking a cost basis under section 1012 in the one half of the 
partnership’s assets attributable to the selling partner.231  The buyer 
is also precluded from tacking on the holding period for which 
those assets were held by the partnership.232  Here, the Service 
states that section 735(b), which normally allows tacking of the 
holding period of property received in a distribution from a 
partnership, “does not apply with respect to the assets that [buyer] 
is deemed to have purchased from [seller].”233  In other words, the 
liquidating distribution normally made by a partnership in a 
technical termination of the partnership is ignored. 
 
 225. Id. at 123. 
 226. Id. at 123-25.  See also Tel. Answering Serv. Co. v. Comm’r, 63 T.C. 423, 
432 (1974), aff’d, 546 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1976) (finding that I.R.C. § 337 required 
recognition of the gain realized on a sale); Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Comm’r, 20 
T.C. 198, 200 (1953) (concluding that tax consequences are determined by the 
purpose for which petitioner paid for stock). 
 227. Rev. Rul. 99-6, 1999-6 I.R.B. 6. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-17-056, supra note 205 (describing asset purchase 
on buyer side, stock sale on seller side). 
 232. Rev. Rul. 99-6, supra note 227. 
 233. Id. 
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4.  Taxpayer’s Ability to Assert “Substance” 
Any taxpayer concluding that form does not govern (and that 
the stock transaction should actually be treated as an asset sale) 
should be cognizant of a tendency in the tax law by which taxpayers 
are “stuck” with the form they choose, even though the 
government may have the prerogative to assert “substance over 
form.”234  However, while ordinarily a taxpayer must live with the 
chosen form, where there is substantial authority in the form of 
case law and Service rulings that treat certain transactions in a 
manner different than their form, the established law and rulings 
prevail over “form” treatment. 
For example, in the context of sale versus lease treatment, “the 
principal Service ruling on the . . . issue establishes standards that 
can evidently be invoked by taxpayers to establish that a purported 
lease is a sale.”235  And revenue rulings, such as Revenue Ruling 69-
242 and Revenue Ruling 67-274, are published with the knowledge 
and expectation that taxpayers will be relying upon them “in 
determining the tax treatment of their own transactions” and to 
avoid the need to “request specific rulings applying the principles 
of a published revenue ruling to the facts of their particular 
cases.”236  With this endorsement of the application of the step 
transaction doctrine to a two-step acquisition, it seems reasonable 
to conclude that the Kimbell-Diamond Doctrine lives with respect to 
non-corporate purchasers, and may be invoked in those situations 
where it historically has been available. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
While the non-corporate KD Doctrine remains viable, the 
practical effect of its viability is shrouded in ambiguity.  There are 
considerable tax policy reasons why taxpayers should not be able to 
circumvent corporate-level taxation, especially where similarly 
situated taxpayers, i.e., corporate purchasers are unable to do so 
 
 234. See, e.g., Nestle Holdings v. Comm’r, 152 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing 
Comm’r v. Nat’l Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 149 (1974) 
(holding “‘taxpayer is free to organize his affairs as he chooses, [but] once having 
done so, . . . he must accept the tax consequences of his choice, whether 
contemplated or not.’”)). 
 235. BORIS I. BITTKER AND LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, 
ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶4.4.6 (2d ed. 1999 supp.) (citing Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 
39). 
 236. Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814, § 7.01(5). 
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without inheriting a tax liability.  But taxpayers are not always so 
circumspect about tax policy when a substantial body of law 
(unamended by legislative, judicial, or administrative action) gives 
apparent imprimatur to treating a two-step acquisition as a direct 
purchase.  Thus, the government should not be surprised if non-
corporate taxpayers invoke the KD Doctrine in circumstances 
where it historically has been applied.  And taxpayers should not be 
surprised if the government asserts that form controls and that the 
taxpayer must live with the federal income tax consequences that 
attend a corporate liquidation event. 
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